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In the last decades, voices from the sci-
entific community have advocated rejec-
tion of free will and personal responsibility
(e.g., Cashmore, 2010). Interpretations of
findings from neuroscience from the last
decades have been used to support this
deterministic assumption. Recent experi-
ments, for example, have detected brain
activity in the prefrontal and parietal cor-
tex up to 10 s before the person is aware of
any decision-making process (Soon et al.,
2008; see also Libet et al., 1983). This
has been interpreted as suggesting that
consciousness is a post-hoc phenomenon,
caused by unconscious neural activity in
the brain. The view of the physical world
as determined, and the human brain as
the organ that enables the mind, leads to
the conclusion that brains and minds are
both determined. If free will is an illusion,
the ramifications to penal law and personal
responsibility need to be reconsidered
(Cheema and Virk, 2012). Nevertheless,
as humans we have an innate urge to
experience a sense of agency or respon-
sibility for our actions (Nichols, 2011).
Even when confronted with setbacks, dis-
appointments, and failures, humansmain-
tain a sense of personal responsibility (see
Gazzaniga, 2011). Failing to be aware of
the self as the cause of one’s own actions
leads to aggressive and less helpful behav-
ior (Baumeister et al., 2009). This arti-
cle presents evidence that there is a pos-
sibility to develop an adequate sense of
responsibility and cooperation in the pres-
ence of genetic and environmental adver-
sity.
We used data from a population-
based cohort of 15-year old twin pairs, to
assess genetic and environmental impact
on self-reported Self-directedness and
Cooperativeness by classic twin methodol-
ogy (this data was published in Garcia
et al., 2013). Here, however, we also
describe the variation of these charac-
ter traits in monozygotic vs. dizygotic
co-twins of individuals with extremely
low scores in Self-directedness and
Cooperativeness. Self-directedness indi-
cates how responsible, purposeful, reliable
and resourceful an individual is in work-
ing to achieve her goals and values (i.e.,
agency), while Cooperativeness indicates
how well adapted she is in getting along
with others fairly, flexibly and with kind-
ness (i.e., communion). Self-directedness
and Cooperativeness are highly predic-
tive of mental health problems across
diagnostic categories (Cloninger et al.,
1993).
The participants consist of same-sex
twins included in the Child and Adolescent
Twin Study in Sweden (CATSS), which is a
nation-wide, population based, longitudi-
nal twin study of mental health. Currently,
the CATSS includes around 20,000 twins,
born from 1992 to 2002, and has a
response rate of about 80% (Anckarsäter
et al., 2011), which makes it the world’s
largest child- and adolescent psychiatric
twin study. At the age of 15 the CATSS-
twins of the 1994–1995 birth cohorts com-
pleted the short (125 items) or the longer
version (238 items) of the Temperament
and Character Inventory (TCI; Cloninger
et al., 1993). The overall TCI response
rate was about 55% and the total num-
ber of participants was 2714 (369 of whom
completed the longer TCI as part of a
clinical study). Zygosity is determined by
a validated algorithm with a >95% pre-
dictive value compared to DNA-testing
(Hannelius et al., 2007). In order to use all
TCI responses, we extracted the items from
the 238-version that correspond to the
125-version (see Garcia et al., 2013). Mx
and SAS (version 9.3) softwares were used
to disentangle the genetic and environ-
mental contribution of Self-directedness
and Cooperativeness. Intra-class correla-
tions and univariate genetic analyses, by
structural equation modeling, were cal-
culated on the continuous scores of each
dimension separately. A total of 831 ado-
lescent same-sex twin pairs (423 monozy-
gotic pairs and 408 dizygotic pairs) were
used in this specific analysis.
We used the TCI mean and stan-
dard deviation scores of the 1994-CATSS
cohort (n = 1340) in order to stan-
dardize the twins’ Self-directedness
and Cooperativeness scores to t-scores
(IBM SPSS version 19) and identified
the probands whose t-scores were ≤2
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standard deviations below the general
population’s mean in each character
dimension. If both twins in a pair met
this criterion, one of them was ran-
domly identified as proband and the other
as co-twin. We found 28 monozygotic-
twins and 32 dizygotic-twins who showed
extremely low Self-directedness and 25
monozygotic-twins and 22 dizygotic-
twins who showed extremely low
Cooperativeness. In order to not depend
on self-assessments alone, co-twins to
probands who also had a parent rated
DSM-IV disruptive behavior disorder (i.e.,
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
oppositional defiant disorder or conduct
disorder according to parent interviews
by the Autism—Tics, AD/HD and other
Comorbidities Inventory; Hansson et al.,
2005) were specifically indicated in the
plots. Twenty-nine percent of the vari-
ance in Self-directedness was attributable
to genetic factors, 22% to environmen-
tal factors that make the twins reared
together similar, and 49% to environmen-
tal factors that make the twins dissimilar.
Thirty-eight percent of Cooperativeness
was attributable to genetic factors, 21%
to environmental factors that make twins
similar, and 41% to environmental fac-
tors that make twins dissimilar (see Garcia
et al., 2013).
Both monozygotic and dizygotic co-
twins of probands with extremely low
Self-directedness and Cooperativeness
had an increased probability of report-
ing low (≤1 standard deviations) or
extremely low Self-directedness and
Cooperativeness (≤2 standard deviations)
as compared to the general population
(see Figure 1, population mean = 50,
standard deviation = 10), but a con-
siderable number of these individuals
had developed character in the aver-
age or high range, in spite of having
exactly the same, or half the genetic
susceptibility of the problem-laden indi-
viduals. Co-twins to probands with both
self-reported and objectively observed
problems did not differ from the overall
pattern.
Environmental and genetic adversities
thus clearly give unequal opportunities to
develop a sense of self-control, coopera-
tion, and responsibility, but with a sub-
stantial plasticity. This study shows that it
is possible to develop a mature character
FIGURE 1 | (A) Distribution of Self-directedness (t-scores) in monozygotic and dizygotic co-twins of
adolescents with extremely low Self-directedness (<2 SD). (B) Distribution of Cooperativeness
(t-scores) in MZ and DZ co-twins of adolescents with extremely low Cooperativeness (<2 SD).
Each triangle denotes one individual. = Co-twin has a disruptive behavior disorder.
in spite of a genetic make-up and/or early
environment associated with a deficient
sense of responsibility and cooperation. A
self-reported sense of responsibility and
cooperation may not reflect actual free-
dom of action, but the scales used here
were developed to assess the degree to
which a person experiences that her behav-
iors over the life-span actually converge
with her intentions, desires and concep-
tualized goals. The scales have also been
shown to measure constructs that are
highly relevant for mental health, includ-
ing pro-social and constructive behavior
patterns (Cloninger, 2004).
CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS
The study does not support sugges-
tions that society should change its
stance/attitude on personal and penal
responsibility in view of genetic or envi-
ronmental determinism, or that inter-
ventions meant to promote responsibility
and cooperation would be meaning-
less. Furthermore, philosophers have dif-
ferent ideas about what it takes to
say that we humans have free will in
a moral-responsibility-grounding sense
(see Jeppsson, 2012). In contrast to
the neuroscience-determinism outlined in
the beginning of this article (i.e., that
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unconscious neural activity in the brain
enables the mind), philosophers also refer
to determinism in terms of that, given the
laws of nature and the past being precisely
what they are, only one future is possi-
ble. In other words, if two persons had
the exact same genetic structure and were
exposed to exactly the same environmental
influences, they would behave exactly the
same. In this framework, some philoso-
phers argue that humans cannot be free
or morally responsible for anything if the
world is deterministic or nearly determin-
istic. Others argue that, as long as we can
choose what to do based on reasons and
have enough self-control; humans can be
considered free and morally responsible
(e.g., Lenman, 2006). In this article we
have showed that people do not lack moral
responsibility only because they have “bad
genes” or come from a “bad environment.”
Furthermore, the results shows that so far,
we have no proof that determinism in the
wider sense is true. However, neither does
our study disprove that the world is deter-
ministic in this sense. Twin studies can-
not falsify this thesis, since not even twins
growing up together are ever exposed to
the same environmental influences down
to the last detail.
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